Even MORE thoughts on...

Recently, I attended the College Building Galleries at the University of Saskatchewan in Saskatoon, and visited a pair of exhibitions by/of/relating to Micah Lexier. The experience got me thinking about conceptualist trends in Canadian art (history), which in turn led me to an interrogation of seemingly-current “community oriented” trends in Canadian art. Perhaps this is due to my having completed an “Artist in the Community” residency in Saskatoon recently, or perhaps it is due to this or this. At any rate, in trying to assess conceptualism on its own grounds, I began to wonder what grounds community art (aka: art of engagement, socially-engaged art, Relational art) is, should be, or would like to be assessed on. I figured that since it has been a year since I launched a shot across the bow of Relational Aesthetics, now would be a good time to consider this further. This is spurred also by my hearing that the artist Rirkrit Tiravanija sells the detritus of his performative actions through his New York dealer Gavin Brown, proving that a service-based economy just isn’t enough, sometimes--and that even champions of socially-engaged art have a commodity-fetish price. This in no way contradicts (and actually supports) my earlier assertion that much Relational Aesthetics is fuelled by capitalism and reinforces corporatism, rather than the community or benevolence it often claims.

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Often, when debate is raised over the issue of Relational Aesthetics, Community Art, or Art as Social Engagement, one issue that arises for me orbits the question of whether this work is Art, or whether it is something else--a debate which often ends up disguising the value or worthlessness of an endeavour. Most of this kind of work, I suspect, is something else, but that’s largely due to my belief that for a thing to be art it must be made with the intent of being art, it must be received as art (by “the Art Community,” whatever the hell that is), and it must consist of a metaphoric parallel (what we used to call “content”). While the first two criteria may be largely acceptable as definitive to the art community at large, the third criterion is likely subjective, and may not find agreement with all or even most people with an interest in the visual arts. Still, I think it’s necessary, otherwise the production inhabits--and should be considered from within--an altogether different context.

But that’s alright, because our inquiry doesn’t necessitate it. Let’s assume for the time being that anything can be art--notice that this is a potential state, and is not to be confused with the assertion that everything IS art. Were we to follow this argument and treat all social, community, or engaged art practice as the art it claims to be, we would likely want to establish a way of assessing whether or not that art work or practice is successful. After all, we do this for all other art forms to date, and despite claims of social artworks being somehow unlike everything we’ve ever seen, we must assume some precedent is being followed as they are nevertheless claiming membership in the pre-existing world of art.

This exploration of the chosen topic is intended philosophically, and as a series of starting points for inquiry into works of relationality that readers may continue on their own. In other words, I don’t wish to provide answers, but rather questions which interested parties may wish to incorporate into their interpretations of the cultural material they are either producing or consuming.

In one model of the assessment of artworks, we find a purely subjective approach, and reception of artworks is a fairly subjective game. At the same time, however, a model of assessment exists in which we judge a work of art according to its own standards, or the supposed intent of its artist. Even if a clear delineation of an artist’s intent is not provided (or if it proves contradictory to the work), we can ask whether the work is consistent with itself and its stated objectives as worked into the project proper. Applying this to socially-focused artistic practice, we can ask: “Is this what it claims to be?” Although, given the supposedly experiential and non-commodified agenda of this kind of work, perhaps we should instead be asking, “does this perform the role it claims to perform?”

Significantly, the rhetoric of these practices is communo-centric. It further seems that this breed of work (such as those works addressed by and labeled as “Relational Aesthetics” by Bourriaud) adopts only the rhetoric of community building, as though the destruction or omission of communities were a) abhorrent, and b) somehow the domain of traditional or object-based practices. This second point is dubious, as human history is replete with examples of organizations and individuals using images and objects to foster community, sometimes with little or no authoritative voice. Furthermore, material artistic production breeds its own kinds of community--professional communities, communities of amateurs, or admirers, or consumers, or scholars, etc.

If we pursue the claim that socially-engaged art practices build community, we might want to examine how they attempt to build community. For example, what sort of community does the work foster? Is it long-lived or short-sighted? Are its participatory subjects engaging with the work (indeed often building the work themselves) out of attraction to the subject matter; out of a pre-existing drive the work happens to fall into step with; because they have been kept from what it is they are actually performing; or have they been in some way coerced into action? Clearly, the latter two possibilities are examples of work which, while it may seem communal, actually manages to maintain a sharply hierarchical structure (dividing those within its community into a pyramidal structure of status, for instance). Finding this the case in a work of social art, then, we may further question whether the work serves Community, a particular community, or a set of communities, or whether it adopts benevolent rhetoric to disguise some other, less egalitarian social structure.

To establish which approach is being taken, we may examine the liberty within the structures proposed (or enforced) by the work. This may be informed by a number of factors, including the degree to which the work is prescriptive in nature, the freedom for its participants to leave or to opt out of the project, their ability to effect change within the project, their responsibility to structures or individuals which created (or, rather, delineated) the work, and so on.

We might also examine the degree to which an individual or an organization absorbs the accolades for a work, produced by the labour of others and at their expense. We might consider egalitarianism as necessary to community, but more loosely we may simply wonder whether such a project considers people collectively, with product or outcome being shared by all members (even if in varying degrees).

We should also feel free to question any dubious relationships to criticality that arise from such a project. Specifically, if we, as a public, are told that a project is “community” oriented; that it is about bringing people together; that it is a collaborative, open endeavour that we all share in; where, then, are we to go if we wish to be critical of such a project? By its nature, it has sought to implicate us--by our acceptance of it or by a mere declaration that it represents our interests--and we therefore might feel as a public that there is no place that exists outside of it. Furthermore, due to the social rhetoric of such projects, critics of such a process or the methods used for such projects risk being ostracized for their dissent--if we are not willing to be team players, the argument might go, then we should shut up. This ethos contradicts entirely my interpretation of what art is and should do; art should encourage the asking of those critical questions, rather than quashing them or alienating those who pose them.

Furthermore, this interrogation of the involvement and agency of the project’s participants--and, by extension, their knowledge of the nature of the project in which they participate--may lead one to examine the claims made by the work regarding its objectives and whether such objectives rely on a commodification of human experience, or instead serve an existing and collective human need.

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These are not the criteria with which we would assess, for instance, a painting. For while a painting is capable of focusing community, reifying culture, or effecting social change, it is honest with its non-participatory nature. Whenever the creation or fostering of community is claimed by a work, however, we would be wise to examine the degree to which such a community is capable of choosing its level of engagement with a work. If such engagement comes in the form of a requirement--with consequences for non-compliance--or in the form of a deception, we are not witnessing a community as much as we are a rigid and exploitative, though unofficial, government.

A thing's designation as "art," after all, can’t justify everything.